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THE USE AND ABUSE OF TIHE POWER
TO PARDON 1,
JAMES P. GoODIcH'2

Crime is always linked in the human mind -with the idea of punishment. Long before written laws were in existence, men were held
responsible for the consequences of their own acts and a rude sort of
justice measured out to them.
With the appearance of written codes came the definition of crimes
with the appropriate punishment suited to the gravity of the offense.
The original purpose of all criminal law until recent years was twof old-to punish- the offender and to protect society against a repetition
of the offense. Blackstone states that the end or purpose of human
punishment is not atonement, or expiation, for that, he says, must be
left to the just determination of the Supreme Being. "The end of
punishment," he says, "is none other than to prevent others from
committing a like offense." The only method suggested by this great
judge and lawyer to prevent a man from repeating the offense was
either to put him to death, or condemn him to perpetual imprisonment
or exile.
Once a criminal always a criminal. When a man was convicted
of a crime, consigned to prison and given the brand of a criminal, all
his after life was without hope of reformation or redemption. The
brand of Cain was upon him and the hand of man against him. Through
the early history of English jurisprudence and until comparatively
recent times the punitive side of the law was emphasized and little or
no thought given to its reformative side. During the last century
wonderful progress has b~en made in criminal jurisprudence. Society
is more and more directing its "thou shalt nots" from the individual
to itself. Hugo's statement that "society stands convicted with every
criminal in the dock," is found under our complex social conditions
to have much truth in it. Society is beginning to realize that while its
crimes against criminals are great, its crimes against itself in its method
of dealing with them is often greater.
The parole laws, the indeterminate sentence laws, laws giving
judges the right to suspend sentence and executives the right to par'Address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Institute of Criminal Law
and Criminology, Indianapolis, Sept. 16, 1920.
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don and parole offenders, are all evidence of the growing belief that
no laws, general in their application as all criminal laws must be, can
be administered by the courts alone without working grave injustice
in many individual cases.
Thoughtful persons fear that a maudlin sentimentality may go
too far in the direction of mercy and lay too little emphasis on the
necessity of certain and inflexible punishment for violated law. The
exercise of clemency by the executive through pardon, parole or the
remission of fine, without any appeal or review of his action is intended
to be the last resort to correct injustices that must arise in the administration of criminal laws, which by their very nature are fixed and
inflexible in their application.
The power to pardon is one of the oldest departments of governmental function. It seemed to have been exercised by the chief of the
tribe to soften the rigor of tribal customs. Side bv side with the harsh
aspects of the written law appear the king and other rulers exercising
the right of pardon, not by any express authorization contained in the
law, but by common consent. The king ruling by divine right, deriving his power from God and not from the people, was superior to and
above the law and claimed and exercised the right to set it aside when
the ends of justice so required.
While the code of Hammurabi, with its long line of statutory
crimes, is silent as to the pardoning power and gives no such authority
to the king, yet we know that it was one of the kingly prerogatives,
for Samsu Illuna, the son of the Great Hammurabi, more than 2,200
years, B. C., pardoned a runaway slave that had, according to the law,
forfeited his life in fleeing from his master.
The Mosaic law nowhere gives the kings or judges the right to
pardon, yet we know that King David exercised the right. The cities
of refuge were established as places where those who innocently shed
blood might escape the hands of the avenger. The right of sanctuary
Nyas a merciful provision to free the individual from the consequences
of his unlawful act.
The Greeks, in Plato's laws, made provision that the prisoner
might, after conviction of his crime and an exile of two or three years,
be pardoned by a group of citizens, twelve in number, and allowed to
return.
During the republic and monarchy of Rome, the power to pardon
was freely exercised by the executive as it was by the early English,
Scottish and Irish kings.
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Before the granting of the great charter-by King John, the kings
granted pardons and forgave offenses against the law, and, ruling by
divine right, not only claimed the right to suspend the law as to individuals, but as to entire classes of individuals. They also claimed that
having the power to pardon after the offense, they might grant a dispensation to violate the law with impunity. Controversies arose between king and parliament over. this clear abuse of power until
finally parliament passed a law abolishing this prerogative of the king,
"as it hath been assumed and exercised of late" and denied the pardoning power of the king in the future, "unless parliament shall make
provision for such power in the terms of the statute."
In the development of English law, it was often found necessary
to abate the cruelty of its criminal statutes through the exercise of'
royal clemency., In cases of justifiable homicide .the jury although convinced of the innocence of the accused could not so find and the only
relief was an appeal to the king. During the reign of Henry III,
parliament enacted: "if the justices have before them a man, who as
the verdict goes, has done a deed of homicide by misadventure or in
self-defense, they shall not acquit him or pardon him. They bid him
hope for the king's mercy." The English courts generally held that
the right to pardon was an ancient remnant of the kingly prerogatives;
since not given to the king by the people, they could not take it away.
While the bare legal right of the king to pardon is still recognized
underl the English law, yet it is only exercised under the advice of
the pgime minister. However much King George may sympathize with
the Mayor of Cork in his hunger strike, and however greatly he may
desire to Order his release, yet as he well says "custom forbids," he is
but the symbol of the Empire and the real power to pardon rests with
the prime minister, Lloyd George.
The American theory of government is that all power is derived
from the people. The state is the mere instrument through which
the sovereign will of the people is expressed. While the right to exercise executive clemency undoubtedly has come down to us from our
English cousins, yet it is certain that had we not inherited it from
them, the conscience and sound judgment of the framers of the constitution would have impelled them to have vested such powers in the
executive. So we find that the federal constitution vests in the president, as does the constitution of the states vest in the executive the
power to pardon, grant reprieves and paroles and remit fines.
The very nature of criminal law makes such a power vested somewhere essential to relieve the rigor and the cruelty of the law. The
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law must, in theory at least, apply to all persons alike. It cannot take
into consideration the particular indiyidual, nor the defects or injustices
that frequently arise in its administration. Cases frequently arise to
which no general rule can apply without the gravest of injustices, and
the most grevious inhumanity, cases where had the legislature known
of the particular facts, and been familiar with the general.surroundings,
it would have relieved them of the general terms of the law, and the
courts had they the power, would have excepted them from the particular statute.
Our federal and state constitutions do not deal with the pardoning
power as a natural prerogative of the executive, as the representative
of the executive department of governmental affairs, but simply as
an adjunct to the administration of justice, recognized in all civilized
governments as necessary by reason of the fallibility of human laws
and human courts. While the power to suspend sentence at the time
it is rendered is an attempt to make a law general in its terms yield to
the requirement of the individual case, yet there is no power in
the court to make new statutes, nor to exempt a particular case from
the operation of the law. After final judgment is 'pronounced, the
case is closed so far as he is concerned.
The judicial field is circumscribed by the regularity and rigidity
of its proceedings. The business of the judge is strictly to apply the
law. The business of the executive under our constitution is not to
make or apply a law, but to relieve the criminal from the unjust application of the law in a particular case.
"There is," says Bouvier, "a kind of equity which is founded in
natural justice, in honesty and right and which arises out of the public
welfare. That is called natural equity. It is this higher, more refined
and less formal equity that belongs to executive clemency where alone
it can be administered because of its elasticity and adaptability of particular application. Under it, state policies, mercy,, propriety of a
particular case, the prosecution, kind and extent of punishment, the
condition, history and future of the convict, and the security of the
community, all become material, relevant and capable of weight in a
particular case. It arises above the law, the exact consequence of acts
prescribed by law will be set aside in view of one more consistent with
the demands of justice or morality."
The necessity of the executive having the power to relieve persons
convicted of crime from the consequences of their acts was clearly
recognized by the makers and builders of our federal constitution.
Alexander Hamilton said in the Federalist, in discussing the sub-
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ject of the pardoning power: "Humanity and good policy inspire to
dictate that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as
possible fettered. The criminal code of every country partakes so
much of necessary severity that without any easy access to exceptions
in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too
sanguinary arnd cruel. '
Chief Justice Marshall defines the pardoning power to be "a constituent part of the judicial system, the judge sees only with judicial
eyes and knows nothing of any particular case of which he is not
informed judicially."
The power vested in the executive being without any limitation
and his action final, it follows that there can be no rule as to how he
shall consider a case, what information he will seek or consider, what
weight he will give to the judicial decision, an affidavit, an unsworn
statement, a petition or facts within his own knowledge, except such
as he may impose upon himself. The constitution vested a -discretion
in the executive officer; his interpretation of that discretion must be
conclusive. The power is a broad one. It is vested in the executive for
the benign purpbse of relieving the criminal from the rigors of the
criminal law whenever the good of society and the welfare of the
criminal demands such action. Ever keeping in mind the twofold purpose of all criminal law, to protect society and reform the wrongdoer,
it is just as much the duty of the executive to act and extend clemency
when the occasion demands as it is for the judge and jury to convict
when the facts presented show a violation of the law.
It is just as much an abuse of the pardoning power for the executive to refuse to grant clemency when the facts justify such action for
fear of adverse and usually ignorant and thoughtless critcism as it is
to grant clemency because of political influence or personal pressure.
The power of the executive to remove a particular case from the
application of the law is a sacred trust and in the administration of that
trust neither fear, favor nor affection should influence him in the
slightest degree. Often the very nature of the law makes executive
action necessary, unless the spirit of the law is to be perverted. In
Indiana we have the usual penalties of fine, imprisonment and deprivation of the rights of citizenship. Under the federal law, and in many
of the states, if a person is fined, after serving thirty days in prison, on
filing an affidavit of no property, the prisoner is released. In Indiana
no such provision obtains and the result is, in effect, imprisonment for
debt. Two men are convicted of the same offense and are give time
and a fine. The one has property with which to pay his fine and at the
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end of his time goes free; the other is without money to pay his fine
and must serve one day for each dollar of fine. This results in a case
that where a sentence of six months and $500 fine has been assessed,
the prisoner ig compelled, when without money to pay his fine, to serve
more than two years, a result that is inhuman in its application, makes
the punishment most severe upon the poor and friendless, a conclusion
certainly not contemplated by the legislature which enacted the law.
I have seldom remitted a fine, but whenever a prisoner, having
served his time, can secure employment dnd is willing to pay from
his wages $1.00 per day on his fine, I usually parole him, restore him
to his family and permit him to pay his fine outside prison walls. The
result has justified such action, for out of over 100 such conditional
paroles, I have had to revoke the paroles for failure to make the
payments in but five cases. I have formed a few rules simple in their
application for my own guidance in the exercise of the pardoning
power.
First, I will not consider any case of a second offender, nor of a
life prisoner, referring all such cases to the pardoning board.
Second, I will not consider any case where it is within the power
of the trustees of the institution in which the prisoner is confined to
grant a parole.
Third, I will not consider any case where a man's prison record
is bad or where he has previously violated a parole.
Fourth, the prison officials and the judge trying the case are
usually asked to recommend the extension of clemency in each case.
In passing upon an appeal for clemency, the presumption should
be kept in mind that the statute invoked was intended to apply and that
the judge acted properly and with correct result. For this reason, if
for no other, the judge and prosecuting attorney should be consulted
before the exercise of executive clemency; not that their judgment
should be final, but charged as they are with the responsibility for the
enforcement of the law, knowing the local conditions and the surroundings and situation of the criminal, their advice in the matter should be
given due weight.
Quite often a judge will at the time of pronouncing the sentence,
believing that the minimum penalty fixed in the statute is too severe
when applied to the particular case, state to the prisoner that he will,
when a certain part of the sentence has been served, recommend clemency. With few exceptions such recommendations are followed. The
enlightened opinion of today recognizes the vital necessity, in the
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administration of the criminal law, of the power to meet the changes
and particular situation which no legislature can foresee.
When we realize that more than thirty-five per cent of criminal
cases are reversed on appeal and how often innocent men suffer because
of their poverty; when we know from the records that ninety-six and
one-half per cent of first offenders paroled by the executive observe
their parole and earn their discharge; when we see how often the great
burden of the punishment, the shame, disgrace and suffering falls
upon the innocent family, it will bring to us a clearer understanding of
the responsibility that rests upon the executive in the exercise of the
pardoning power.
It cannot be said that no consideration should be given by the
executive to the family and the surroundings of the criminal. The
very purpose of lodging the pardoning power in the executive is to
relieve exceptional situations where it is to be presumed that the legislature passing the law might have fixed a different penalty had it
been. familiar with the facts. I illustrate what I mean by two cases that
came before me this week-one, the wife of a criminal, came into
my office with six children, the youngest five months of age and the
oldest ten years. Her husband had been sent to prison for from one
to five years for stealing chickens, leaving her with the six children
without any property whatever, except the houshold goods. Living
with her was her widowed mother sixty-five years old and the sister
nineteen years old, the latter a stenographer earning eighteen dollars a
week and the sole bread winner of the family, except that the wife and
mother were doing washing at the house and adding to the earnings
of the sister. The total income of this family of ten was less than
thirty dollars a week. The mother became ill, could no longer wash
and in her distress the wife appealed for clemency for the husband
who has been in prison for eight months. She said if her husband was
not released she would not be able to keep tne family together, but
would be compelled to place them in an orphan's home. The former
employers of the criminal had in writing offered him back his job at
six dollars a day if released.
I claim that this is a plain case for executive clemency. It is the
man's first offense. Apparently he had lived a correct life up to that
point when sickness in his own family, according to his statement, led
him to commit the theft. Is society better off to let this woman struggle
on with impossible conditions, the family to be broken up and this man
at the end of three months more come out embittered against society,
or is it better for society to extend clemency, give him another chance
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in life, restore him to his family and permit him to take care of them?
The mere statement of the situation brings the answer.
Yesterday I received a letter from which I quote:
"I am writing you concerning and pleading for my husband and fainily. He is in prison and as it is so hard for us to get along without him,
and I have been trying to come to see you personally, but as it costs so
much and I have not enough to get on, only just what I work and get, and
that is not very much. My husband was sentenced the nineteenth day of
June and was taken away from us without leaving me any money. I have
four children to care for, the oldest ten years and an invalid; the others
eight, five and three years. I don't feel like I am able to work and keep the
home together and keep my children in school. You know children must
be kept in school, and I have to work ten hours a day and I walk two
miles each way to my work and then come home and do my housework
to keep my children in school and my family together. I am not stout,.
but the Lord has been merciful with me, for I have stood the work and
worry so much better than I ever thought I could. Now, my husband did
wrong and should never have taken the $50 that he did, but he is not paying back one penny where he is, and if you will let him out I and himself
are willing to work every way and try to pay every cent of it back."
These two cases are typical of hundreds of cases that come before
the executive. Seventy-six per cent of those applying for clemency do
so without intervention of lawyers, many times because they are too
poor to employ them. Just so long as the law for the protection of
society continues to deprive the innocent family of its sole support,
with no provision for their care, just that long will these cases appeal
with great and convicing force to the conscience of the executive,
unless he is indifferent to human distress.
After nearly four years of experience and a careful study of the
whole question, I am fully convinced that the public interest is best
served, the reform of the prisoner more certainly attained and the
welfare of the family and the immediate community advanced by a
liberal but discriminating use of the pardoning power than by its
harsh and restricted use. Mistakes will be made, men occasionally will
be released who should have served their full time, but for every mistake so made scores of men will be restored to society never again ta
transgress the law, many families united and made happy, the just
demands of the law satisfied and society benefited by such a policy.
The pardoning power is the most sacred, the most difficult of all
executive functions. It is intended to be used to temper justice with
mercy, to be so applied that while society shall be protected and the
majesty of the law vindicated, its weight shall not fall on the individual
and his family in such manner as to embitter them toward society and
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cause them to feel that the law does not apply with equal weight to all
persons. Some hold that the power is one that should seldom be exercised and then only in exceptional cases where facts that become known
after conviction throw doubt upon the justness of the verdict of the
court. That the frquent use of the pardoning power brings the courts
into disrepute, dispels fear of the law, encourages an increase of crime
and creates a spirit of Bolshevism and unrest among the people, I do
not believe. If the law fell with equal weight upon everyone, if high
and low, rich and poor who are guilty of its infraction, alike suffered
its penalty, there might be some reason for insisting that the guilty
should in all cases pay the full penalty of the law; but too often in this
state I have seen the law applied with unequal weight, seen men of
high estate surrounded by influential friends violate the law with impunity and go unwhipped of justice, seen public officials charged with
the execution of a high trust violate the law, betray their trust, embezzle
public funds and when discovered, because the official or his bondsmen
made restitution, be permitted to go unpunished, while men in places
of power and influence have shielded them. At the same time men
who have committed some petty offense, but are without money or
influential friends to protect them, have the full penalty of the law
inflicted on them. It is most difficult through our local courts and
juries to secure the prosecution and conviction of men of high social,
financial and political standing who violate the law.
It is this situation and not the liberal but discriminating use of
the pardoning power that creates unrest, anarchism and Bolshevism,
and a conviction that the law means one thing to the man of low estate
and a far different thing to a man of high estate. We need everywhere
a new baptism of respect for law and order and a more insistent
demand that the violation of law, when detected, shall be followed by
sure and swift punishment regardless of the station in life of the
offender. Because of the nature of the jurisdiction,. the opportunity
for favoritism, selfish interest political consideration and caprice and
.he impossibility of reviewing the decision, the exercise of the power
is likely to excite unreasonable complaint.
In the very nature of the case the people must trust largely to the
good faith, the honesty of purpose and discretion of their public servants if they are to have a government worth anything. They cannot
have an efficient government if they do not allow a large freedom in
its movement, and honest and honorable men will not be attracted to
the public service, or will hesitate to discharge their full duty if they
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are always to be suspected by the people and charged with improper
motives in the administration of its affairs.
After a careful survey of the record made during the past four
years in my own state, during the trying years of the war and the
unsettled period that followed, observing the effect upon the persons
and the families of those to whom clemency has been extended, I have
no hesitation in saying that more errors have been committed where
clemency has been refused than where it has been extended.

